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The late Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg once said, 
“Women belong in all places where decisions are being made . . . It 
shouldn’t be that women are the exception.”1  The only way our 
society can benefit from the experience, insights, and intellect of all 
humanity is through the equal participation of women, which is 
“vital to stability, helps prevent conflict, and promotes sustainable, 
inclusive development.2  Our institutions maintain a layer of 
inequality based on the needs of one gender.  Caroline Criado Perez 
calls this “‘default man’ thinking: The unquestioned assumption that 
men are standard, and women the exception.”3  Female 
representation on corporate boards is but one example of a case in 
which “men are the standard, and women the exception.”4  Equitable 
gender representation has recently developed into a sizeable issue of 
concern for corporate boards.  Studies demonstrate various benefits 
experienced by corporations as a result of having more diverse 
boards of directors.  This, combined with pressures from 
stakeholders, has led to slight increases in corporate board diversity, 
but boards have been generally slow to diversify.  A number of policy 
solutions have been put forward to further advance gender equity on 
corporate boards, including the use of shareholder derivative actions 
for breach of fiduciary duty if the board fails to diversify as well as 
states’ adoption of gender quota laws; these solutions have had little 
traction, calling for the creation of new methods. 
 
∗ J.D. Candidate 2021, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A., University of 
Kansas.  
 1. Mary Kate Cary, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Experience Shows the Supreme Court Needs 
More Women, U.S. NEWS (May 20, 2009), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/mary-kate-
cary/2009/05/20/ruth-bader-ginsburgs-experience-shows-the-supreme-court-needs-more-women. 
 2. Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Twenty-first Century Must Be Century of 
Women’s Equality, Secretary-General Says in Remarks at The New School (Feb. 27, 2020). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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This article argues in favor of an alternative approach, promoting 
gender diversification of corporate boards through the proxy process 
and other corporate governance tools at shareholders’ disposal, 
rather than through externally imposed requirements or litigation. 
The proxy process provides a forum in which shareholders may cause 
meaningful change to the company. Shareholders should take 
advantage of this medium to nominate director candidates to 
diversify boards, compel companies to have board members commit 
to more equitable gender representation, and submit proposals 
recommending the adoption and implementation of policies 
promoting gender equity. Notably, these recommendations transect 
with current discourse regarding the shareholder voice in the proxy 
process, illustrating the importance of robust shareholder access to 
the proxy. 
This article proceeds as follows.  Part II details the challenge of 
achieving gender parity on corporate boards by presenting historical 
data on the lack of female representation.  Part III acknowledges the 
mixed findings of board gender diversity and firm performance, but 
then emphasizes why the positive correlations are determinative and 
of particular importance to companies.  Part IV reviews the range of 
externally imposed policy solutions to improve female board 
representation, including disclosure requirements, shareholder 
derivative suits, regulation, and legislation, and highlights the 
limitations associated with these tactics.  Part V puts forth an 
alternative approach to increase gender diversity on corporate boards 
and encourages the use of various tools available to shareholders, 
including active shareholder participation in the director nomination 
process, and the use of institutional investors to place external 
pressures on companies to increase female representation and 
achieve gender parity. This article asserts that increased shareholder 
participation in the director nomination process and the utilization of 
other mechanisms available to shareholders, including institutional 
investors placing pressures on companies to diversify or 
recommending the adoption of provisions such as the Rooney Rule, 
are long-term, effective strategies that will increase female 
representation on corporate boards. 
 
II. HISTORICAL DATA AND STATISTICS 
DEMONSTRATE THE LACK OF BOARD GENDER 
DIVERSITY 
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Now more than ever, stakeholders are advocating for gender 
parity on corporate boards; while the industry has taken steps 
towards realizing gender parity, the data exemplifies the fact that 
boards have been slow to diversify.  This intractable problem has 
been an issue for decades, emphasizing the need for alternative policy 
solutions to address the issues of equitable gender representation.  In 
1993, 69% of Fortune 500 companies maintained at least one woman 
on their board, and in 1998, that percentage increased to 86%.5  At 
first glance, this 17% increase appears to be a sign of significant 
change, but a more accurate depiction of the progress public 
companies have made in regard to increasing female representation 
quantify the percentage of board seats held by women.  In 1993, 
women held 8.3% of all Fortune 500 board seats;6 in 1998, this statistic 
rose to 11.1%.7  By 2010, the percentage of Fortune 500 company 
board seats held by women had only risen to 15.7%.8  These numbers 
began to rise in 2018, due in large part to a combination of factors 
including the #MeToo movement and the passage of state legislation, 
such as Senate Bill 826.  In 2018, 22.5% of Fortune 500 companies’ 
board seats were held by women,9 and in 2019, that number rose to 
25.5%.10  This 3% increase over the course of one year, compared to 
the 4.6% increase that took place between 1998 and 2010, 
demonstrates just how impactful the #MeToo movement and state 
legislation was in 2018.  However, these advances still leave women 
grossly underrepresented in the boardroom, begging the question of 
how further progress can be made.  What is even more demonstrative 
of society’s appetite for change is the increase in percentage of new 
directors that are women.  The total number of women holding new 
 
 5. 1995 Catalyst Census: Female Board Directors of the Fortune 500, CATALYST 1, 3 
(1995); 1998 Catalyst Census: Women Board Directors of the Fortune 500, CATALYST 1, 5 (1998). 
 6. Id. at 7. 
 7. Id. at 2. 
 8. 2010 Catalyst Census: Fortune 500 Women Board Directors, CATALYST 1, 2 (2010). 
 9. Quick Take: Women on Corporate Boards, CATALYST (Mar. 13, 2020), 
https://www.catalyst.org/research/women-on-corporate-boards/. 
 10. Courtney Connley, The number of women running Fortune 500 companies is at a record 
high, CNBC MAKE IT (May 16, 2019, 12:30 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/16/the-number-
of-women-running-fortune-500-companies-is-at-a-record-high.html. 
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board positions at Russell 3000 companies rose from 12% in 2008 to 
45% in 2019.11 
The data clearly demonstrates that while public companies are 
moving in the right direction, it has been a slow, gradual process.  
Additionally, review of the statistics may lead one to assume that, in 
response to pressures from various stakeholders and in some 
instances to be in compliance with recently passed state legislation, 
public corporations have added a “token” woman to their boards of 
directors and have not adequately addressed the issue of gender-
diversity on corporate boards.  In light of evidence on the benefits of 
diversity experienced by companies, it is difficult to explain the 
hesitation in transitioning to more diversified boards.  These statistics 
demonstrate that, while the diversification of corporate boards 
provides equal opportunity to historically marginalized individuals 
previously excluded from such positions of power, the corporate 
community’s motivations in pursuing diversity-related measures is 
prompted by much more than a moral obligation to redress past 
discriminatory acts and behaviors.12  With shareholder value serving 
as the main objective in most, if not all, corporate decisions, the 
business case for diversity may hold more sway.  The next section 
presents this evidence. 
 
III. STUDIES SUGGEST CORPORATIONS BENEFIT 
FROM FEMALE REPRESENTATION ON CORPORATE 
BOARDS 
 
Evidence that increased female representation on corporate 
boards positively affects company performance and shareholder 
value is mixed; some studies found negative correlations or no 
correlation between board diversity and firm performance, while 
others found positive correlations.  Though the evidence that 
increased gender representation on corporate boards positively 
correlates to firm performance is unclear, what is clear is that board 
diversity leads to other outcomes, which are known to lead to good 
financial performance and increased shareholder value.  First, this 
 
 11. Subdodh Mishra, U.S. Board Diversity Trends in 2019, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (June 18, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/06/18/u-s-board-diversity-
trends-in-2019/. 
 12. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the 
Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, WISC. L. REV., 795, 804, (2005). 
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section will acknowledge a sample of studies that found a negative 
correlation or no correlation, between board diversity and firm 
performance.  Second, this section will review studies that found a 
positive correlation between increased female representation on 
corporate boards and firm performance, as well as discuss why these 
studies are of particular importance to companies.  Third, this section 
will discuss positive correlations to firm performance not only 
through included financial performance and shareholder value, but 
also board productivity, corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) initiatives, and 
increased female representation in executive leadership. 
A number of studies have found negative correlation or no 
correlation between board diversity and firm performance and, as a 
result, undermines companies’ efforts to maximize shareholder 
value.13  For example, one study found that boards which did not 
maintain an egalitarian board culture would not realize the benefits 
of socially and professionally diverse boards, while those that did 
experienced the positive effects more strongly.14  Boards were more 
likely to maintain egalitarian culture if they maintained higher 
proportions of independent directors and institutional investors.15  
The finding where boards that lacked egalitarian principles were less 
likely to experience the benefits of increased female representation on 
corporate boards does not diminish the value of gender diversity, but 
simply adds another consideration that must be handled in the 
pursuit towards gender parity on corporate boards.  In order for 
companies to obtain the value from increased female representation, 
companies must foster a culture that promotes diversity of opinion 
and values various perspectives equally.  Another study found that 
as female representation on corporate boards increased, the market 
value of those companies decreased; companies that had been 
recognized through higher rankings for their organizations’ diversity 
practices were the companies most impacted by the decrease in 
 
 13. Stephanie J. Creary, Mary-Hunter (“Mae”) McDonnell, Sakshi Ghai & Jared Scruggs, 
When and Why Diversity Improves Your Board’s Performance, HARV. BUS. REV. (March 27, 
2019), https://hbr.org/2019/03/when-and-why-diversity-improves-your-boards-performance. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Yannick Thams, Bari L. Bendell & Siri Terjesen, Explaining women’s presence on 
corporate boards: The institutionalization of progressive gender-related policies, 86 J OF BUS. 
RESEARCH SEC. 5. 130, 135,138 (2018). 
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market value.16  As was the case with the other study, the results do 
not suggest that investors do not believe women serving as board 
members is an obstruction of shareholder value, “but that the firm, 
by choosing to appoint women directors, is prioritizing diversity” 
and therefore “deprioritizing shareholder value maximization.”17 
Gender diversification of corporate boards positively impacts a 
company’s financial performance.  One of the most cited studies was 
conducted by Credit Suisse Research Institute, which issued a report 
in August 2012 analyzing the relationship between gender diversity 
on corporate boards and financial performance of 2,360 companies 
around the world from 2005 to 2011.18  Companies with one or more 
female directors on their boards delivered higher average returns on 
equity and growth than those with no women on the board.19  Fortune 
500 companies maintaining female representation on their boards 
were found to have even higher performance statistics than those 
with no female directors.20  Notably, Fortune 500 companies with 
gender-diverse boards experienced an average of 84% improvement 
on return on sales, 60% improvement on return on capital, and 46% 
improvement on return on equity.21  The inclusion of at least one 
woman on a board has led to 40% fewer financial restatements.22  
Recently, one study found that companies with increased female 
representation have delivered better returns with lower volatility, 
compared to their more-homogenous peers.23 
Though the evidence that increased gender representation on 
corporate boards leads to good financial outcomes is mixed, it is clear 
that board diversity leads to other outcomes, which are known to lead 
 
 16. Isabelle Solal & Kaisa Snellman, Women Don’t Mean Business? Gender Penalty in Board 
Composition, 2 (INSEAD Working Paper No. 2019/20/OBH, 2019). 
 17. Kim Elsesser, Increasing Diversity And Profits? Investors Think Companies Can’t Do 
Both, FORBES (July 20, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kimelsesser/2020/07/20/increasing-
diversity-and-profits-investors-think-companies-cant-do-both/?sh=45950c4022bc (quoting 
Isabelle Solal). 
 18. Katherine W. Phillips, How Diversity Makes Us Smarter, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Oct. 1, 
2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-diversity-makes-us-smarter/. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Why Women on Boards?, BOARDBOUND BY WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP FOUNDATION, 
https://womensleadershipfoundation.org/add-women-boards-directors (last visited Oct. 24, 2020). 
 21. The Bottom Line: Corporate Performance and Women’s Representation on Boards 
(2004-2008), CATALYST 1,1 (2011). 
 22. Lawrence J. Abbott, Susan Parker &Theresa J. Presley, Female Board Presence and the 
Likelihood of Financial Restatement, 26 ACCOUNTING HORIZONS 607, 620 (2012). 
 23. Why It Pays to Invest in Gender Diversity, MORGAN STANLEY, (May 11, 2016), 
https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/gender-diversity-investment-framework. 
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to good financial performance.  A number of studies suggest that 
investing in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) initiatives 
has had a positive effect on a company’s financial market 
performance.24  Studies lend support to the notion that corporations 
will benefit from the addition of female directors and the 
maintenance of a diversified board.  Research findings suggest female 
directors positively impact various aspects of the corporation, 
including financial performance and shareholder value, corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), corporate governance, and board 
productivity; these studies support the business case for increased 
female representation on corporate boards. 
Companies, through the maintenance of gender-diverse boards, 
may reduce groupthink and, therefore, increase board productivity.25  
Groupthink, a psychological phenomenon where cohesive groups 
reach a consensus in which the “strivings for unanimity override their 
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action,” 
may be reduced by increasing female representation on corporate 
boards.26  Homogenous boards, or those lacking gender parity, may 
fall victim to groupthink, putting the company at greater risk and 
reducing board productivity; to mitigate the risks associated with 
groupthink, studies recommend the addition and maintenance of 
female directors, who are less susceptible to groupthink and are 
generally better able to recognize the needs and interests of different 
stakeholder groups.27 
Corporations with women on boards experienced increases in 
corporate social responsibility and improved reputations.28  Deutsche 
Bank conducted one of the most comprehensive reviews on this 
subject in 2012, and found that all of the academic studies in Deutsche 
Bank’s examinations indicated that organizations with higher ESG 
and CSR standards had “a lower cost of capital in terms of debt (loans 
and bonds) and equity.”29  The report concluded these higher 
 
 24. Charles Mitchell et al., The Business Case for Corporate Investment in Sustainable 
Practices, THE CONFERENCE BOARD 1, 3 (2016). 
 25. Eunjung Hyun, Daegyu Yang, Hojin Jung & Kihoon Hong, Women on Boards and 
Corporate Social Responsibility 1, 9 (2016); Paul’t Hart, Irving L. Janis’ Victims of Groupthink, 
12 POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 247, 256 (1991). 
 26. Hart, supra note 25, at 256. 
 27. Maretno Harjoto, Indrarini Laksmana & Robert Lee, Board Diversity and Corporate 
Social Responsibility, 132(4) J BUS. ETHICS 641, 650 (2015). 
 28. Hyun et al., supra note 25, at 2. 
 29. Mitchell et al., supra note 24, at 3. 
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standards are tantamount to lower risk and are “rewarded by capital 
markets.”30  These findings refute the prior assumption that 
maximizing shareholder value and CSR initiatives are not cohesive, 
and even suggest a positive correlation between the two.  Increasing 
female representation on corporate boards may result in higher levels 
of CSG and subsequently increase shareholder value.  Additionally, 
companies maintaining female representation on their boards 
experienced fewer “governance-related controversies, such as 
bribery, corruption, fraud, and shareholder battles.”31 
The relationship between gender diversification of corporate 
boards and that of executive leadership also positively impact 
profitability and value creation.  One study found that corporations 
ranked in the top 25% in regard to gender diversification among 
executive leadership teams are more likely to outperform other 
companies on profitability by 21% and value creation by 27%.32  
Alternatively, companies “pay a price for lacking diversity” – in 
regard to gender and ethnic/cultural diversity, the bottom 25% of 
companies were 29% less likely to experience profitability above the 
industry average.33  Another found a strong correlation between 
women in the C-suite and firm profitability.34  “A profitable firm at 
which 30% of leaders are women could expect to add more than 1 
percentage point to its net margin compared with an otherwise 
similar firm with no female leaders.”35  When the study was 
conducted in 2016, the standard profitable firm’s net margin observed 
in the sample was 6.4% and, therefore, a 1 percentage point increase 
would result in a 15% increase in firm profitability.36  These studies 
are consistent with other findings made by organizations such as 
Catalyst and McKinsey, demonstrating that consultants, another 
major player in the corporate governance space, agree that board 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Linda-Eling Lee, Ric Marshall, Damion Rallis & Matt Moscardi, Women on Boards: 
Global Trends in Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards, MSCI INC. 1, 6 (2015). 
 32. Vivian Hunt, Lareina Yee, Sara Prince & Sundiatu Dixon-Fyle, Delivering Through 
Diversity, MCKINSEY & CO. (2018). 
 33. Id. at 9. 
 34. Marcus Noland, Tyler Moran & Barbara Kotschwar, Is Gender Diversity Profitable? 
Evidence from a Global Survey (Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper 16-
3, 2016). 
 35. Id. at 8-9. 
 36. Id. 
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diversity is an issue of importance and worth advocating for.37  
Analysis of the S&P 1500, which accounts for almost 90% of the 
overall U.S stock market capitalization, over a twelve-year period, 
found that increasing female representation on corporate boards led 
to increases in representation of women in companies’ top 
management positions.38  Additionally, the increase in female 
representation at the executive level will positively impact the pool 
of women qualified to hold board positions.  One of the factors 
considered when reviewing potential director nominees is prior CEO 
and CFO experience; two thirds of newly appointed directors have 
prior or current CEO or CFO experience.39  Increasing female 
representation in executive positions may subsequently increase the 
qualified pool of potential female board member nominees. 
Though some of the evidence is mixed, major players, including 
shareholders, consultants, academics, and the SEC staff, support the 
general understanding that gender diversity benefits companies. 
Despite the mounting evidence of the business benefits companies 
gain from having female representation on their boards, companies 
have only made slow and incremental progress to diversify.  
Consequently, policymakers and advocates have stepped in to 
advance the cause of gender parity.  The next Section outlines three 
policy solutions utilized by various stakeholders that increased 
female representation on corporate boards in light of the 
shortcomings of each. 
 
IV. POLICY MECHANISMS, LITIGATION, AND 
EXTERNALLY-IMPOSED REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT 
EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES TO INCREASE BOARD 
GENDER DIVERSITY 
 
Several policy solutions have been articulated and proposed to 
further advance the cause of gender parity on corporate boards, but 
 
 37. AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW, 
GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY 32 (2015) (citing Diana Bilimoria, “The Relationship between 
Women Corporate Directors and Women Corporate Officers” (2006) 18:1 J. OF MANAGERIAL 
ISSUES 47 at 57 (“The findings of this study empirically support the notion that women corporate 
board directors and top management gender diversity are positively related.”). 
 38. David A. Matsa & Amalia R. Miller, Chipping Away at the Glass Ceiling: Gender 
Spillovers in Corporate Leadership, AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC., 1, 2,7 (2011). 
 39. Bonnie W. Gwin, Chief Executive Officer & Board of Directors, Trends in Board 
Composition Over the Past Five Years, HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, Oct. 2015, at A2. 
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they all have significant limitations.  First, this section will discuss the 
ineffectiveness of the Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) 
policy requiring disclosure of a board’s diversity considerations as 
they relate to the nomination of directors.  Additionally, this section 
will discuss the use of shareholder derivative suits and the 
shortcomings of this approach due to the safe harbor protections 
afforded to board members.  The section will then highlight the 
legislative steps California and Washington have taken to promote 
equitable gender representation and review the issues relating to the 
constitutionality of the legislation as well as other potential 
consequences. 
 
A. ITEM 407(C)(2)(VI) 
 
The SEC maintains diversity disclosure requirements, in which 
companies that consider diversity in director nominations must 
disclose how and in what way diversity is considered.40  If a company 
considers diversity characteristics, Item 407(c)(2)(vi) requires the 
company to describe the ways in which the board implements the 
diversity considerations in identifying director nominations.41  The 
motivations behind the disclosure were to promote diversity and 
transparency relating to the governance practices of a company, key 
issues identified by not only shareholders, but also consultants, 
academics, and corporate insiders.42  It was believed that such 
disclosure would enable investors to make “informed voting and 
investment decisions.”43 
Though well-intentioned, the discretion provides the board with 
a number of ways to circumvent the disclosure requirements.  First, 
the SEC does not define the term “diversity,” enabling each 
individual company to draft and utilize its own interpretation of 
diversity.  For example, some have defined the term diversity to 
include gender, race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, while others 
have utilized a broader approach, defining diversity as differences in 
 
 40. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407 (2020). 
 41. SEC Compliance & Disclosure Interpretations, Question 116.11 (Sept. 21, 2020). 
 42. Public Statement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Shareholders Need Robust 
Disclosure to Exercise Their Voting Rights as Investors and Owners (Feb. 20, 2013) (on file with 
author). 
 43. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 33-9089; 34-61175; IC-
29092; File No. S7-13-09, 38 (Feb. 10, 2010). 
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perspective, professional experience, and education.44  Additionally, 
the SEC knew investors were “particularly interested in board 
policies regarding gender and/or racial diversity,” yet still permitted 
companies to define the term, excluding those characteristics.  
Finally, a corporation may have poor intentions, and, in order to 
avoid the disclosure requirement altogether, a nominating committee 
may simply elect to not consider diversity under any circumstance in 
the director nomination process.  This thwarts the SEC’s original 
intent in establishing this rule and results in a lack of information 
available to investors in order to make informed decisions.  This 
result was an unforeseen consequence of the rule that further 
demonstrates the ineffectiveness of Item 407(c)(2)(vi) as a successful 
tool to increase female representation on corporate boards.  The 
diversity disclosure requirements obligating companies to disclose 
whether, and if so how, diversity characteristics are considered in the 
director nomination process is not an effective means of promoting 
gender diversity on corporate boards and should not be relied upon 
as such a mechanism. 
 
B. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUITS 
 
Directors of a corporate board are obligated to perform their 
duties with the “amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent 
men would use in similar circumstances.”45  A shareholder or 
shareholder group may, on behalf of the corporation, file a 
shareholder derivative action against a corporate officer for breach of 
a fiduciary duty.46  It has been argued that directors have a fiduciary 
duty to their shareholders to diversify the board, and therefore, are 
subject to liability if one or more members of the board violates this 
duty in some way.47  Some have encouraged shareholders to file 
derivative suits against directors of companies maintaining a 
homogenous board for violating their fiduciary duty of care owed to 
the shareholders of the company.48  Promoters of this approach argue 
 
 44. Id. at 38-39. 
 45. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (2005). 
 46. Derivative Action, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
 47. Mary Parmeter, Comment, The Fiduciary Duty to Gender Diversify Within Corporate 
Boards: The Necessary Link Among Shareholder Primacy, The Director Nomination Process, and 
Higher Financial Return, 32 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 85, 98 (2017). 
 48. Id. at 100 
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that directors who purposefully sidestep female director candidates 
or intentionally ignore the studies’ findings by failing to include 
qualified female candidates throughout the director nomination 
process have violated their fiduciary duty of care.49 
There have been a number of derivative suits filed against the 
directors and officers of corporations including Oracle Corporation 
(Oracle), Facebook, Inc., and Qualcomm, Inc., claiming, among other 
things, breach of fiduciary duty for lack of board diversity.  
Specifically, the complaint against Oracle further claims that the 
company’s failure to diversify has caused “severe financial and 
reputational damage to Oracle.”50 
Here, the use of shareholder derivative suits faces significant 
obstacles and limitations.  Delaware, where more than half of all 
publicly traded corporations are incorporated, provides two types of 
safe harbors for fiduciaries, the business judgment rule, a rebuttable 
presumption of good faith,51 and the exculpatory provision provided 
for in Delaware Code Annotated title 8, 102(b)(7).52 
Under the business judgment rule, it is presumed that a 
corporation’s directors, in making business decisions, act in good 
faith, on an informed basis, and in the honest belief that such act is in 
the best interest of the corporation.53  The fact that the judicial system 
is not in the best position to assess business decisions, as well as the 
role hindsight bias may play in the court’s assessment of such 
decisions, supports the presumption established by the rule.54 
In the case of director nominations, it seems unlikely that a court 
would find a breach of fiduciary duty because of the court’s emphasis 
on process, rather than outcomes, where hindsight bias can impact 
one’s rationale and decision.  Shareholders would be required to 
demonstrate a lack of good faith in nominating a male director 
candidate or a lack of good faith in not selecting a female director 
candidate.  A corporation, in response to such a claim, would 
 
 49. Id. at 104 
 50. Complaint at 10, Klein v. Ellison, (N.D. Cal. 2020) (No. 3:20-cv-04439). 
 51. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 124 (2009). 
 52. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102 (2020). 
 53. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 124. 
 54. Id. (“Hindsight bias is the tendency for people with knowledge of an outcome to 
exaggerate the extent to which they believe that outcome could have been predicted.” Hal R. Arkes 
& Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. The Business Judgment Rule: Differences in 
Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 587 (1994). In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 
964 A.2d 106, 124 n.50 (Del. Ch. 2009).). 
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acknowledge that in selecting the male director candidate to join the 
board, the corporation’s directors believed they were acting in the 
best interests of the company.  It would be incredibly difficult for the 
shareholders to prove that a company’s board of directors acted in 
bad faith when, in the end, the board selected a qualified candidate, 
even if that director candidate is male.  For the foregoing reasons, the 
business judgment rule creates a steep uphill battle for shareholders 
to demonstrate directors have breached their fiduciary duty for 
failing to diversify their boards. 
The exculpatory provision provided for in Section 102(b)(7) of 
the Delaware General Corporation Law, which may be adopted as 
part of a company’s certificate of incorporation, provides a separate 
barrier for derivative suits.  Section 102(b)(7) alleviates directors of 
liability for monetary damages resulting from breaches of the duty of 
care.55  More than forty other states have adopted similar provisions; 
one sample found that by 1990, more than 90% of public companies 
had adopted such provisions.56  Plaintiffs to duty of care shareholder 
derivative suits are limited by Section 102(b)(7) because it further 
narrows the scope of claims to those non-exculpated by the 
provision.57 
These protections afforded to fiduciaries, and the courts’ 
deference to such protections, drastically constrict the impact and 
effectiveness such derivative suits could potentially have in 
promoting board diversity and, therefore, is not an efficient approach 
to improve female representation on corporate boards. 
 
C. STATE LEGISLATION 
 
The use of state legislation to increase female representation on 
corporate boards is another policy solution proposed and 
implemented in some jurisdictions, including California.  This 
subsection will first address the advances made under the California 
statute. Second, this subsection will explain the broad consensus as to 
why the California statute and similar legislation is unconstitutional.  
Third, this subsection will acknowledge that, while there has yet to 
 
 55. 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7) (2020). 
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be a successful challenge to date, the law’s position is precarious and 
thus should not be relied on as the sole mechanism for increasing 
gender diversity on corporate boards. 
To promote equitable representation of corporate boards, the 
California legislature passed SB 826 requiring public companies to 
maintain a requisite number of women on their board of directors.58  
The state of Washington passed a similar law, Senate Bill 6037 (SB 
6037), in March of 2020.59  To be in compliance with SB 826 and SB 
6037, public companies subject to the laws must maintain gender-
diverse boards sufficient to satisfy the gender quota requirements set 
by the respective laws.60  Failure to comply with the SB 826 results in 
a minimum fine of $100,000.61  Alternatively, SB 6037 provides for a 
less fiscally burdensome solution; if a company does not maintain a 
gender-diverse board, the organization must provide shareholders 
with information relating to the company’s diversity policies and 
procedures.62  SB 826 and SB 6037 embody legislation utilized 
overseas in western European countries such as France, Norway, and 
Spain.63 
Though SB 826 led to a dramatic increase in female 
representation on corporate boards, imperfections in the law and 
questions as to the law’s constitutionality hinder its overall 
effectiveness and usefulness as a long-term tactic to achieve gender 
parity.  SB 826 resulted in one of the largest surge’s in female 
representation on corporate boards.  One study analyzed the board 
composition of 488 California companies that filed proxy statements 
from January 2019 to July 2019.64  These companies exhibited a 23% 
increase in female representation on corporate boards, with women 
obtaining 143 board seats.65  The authors of this study also found that 
pre-SB 826, 188 of the 650 firms headquartered in California did not 
have any female members on their boards, but by December 31, 2019, 
 
 58. Cal. Stat. S.B. 826 (2018). 
 59. Wash. Stat. S.B. 6037 (2020). 
 60. Cal. Stat. S.B. 826 (2018); Wash. Stat. S.B. 6037 (2020). 
 61. Cal. Stat. S.B. 826 (2018). 
 62. Wash. Stat. S.B. 6037 (2020). 
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that number decreased to 21.66  Notably, seven of the companies with 
homogenous male boards moved their principal places of business 
outside the state of California.67 
While the passage of SB 826 led to a surge in female 
representation on corporate boards, the law was immediately 
challenged.  Though a later decision to strike down a law will not 
necessarily reverse the gains obtained in the surge, it may 
disincentivize other states, especially those with company-friendly 
legislation where many companies are incorporated, to adopt similar 
legislation, and therefore negatively impacts use of the law as a long-
term strategy to reach gender parity.68  The creation of an express 
gender classification likely violates the Equal Protection Clause of 
both the California Constitution and the United States Constitution.  
Additionally, the fact the law is applicable to corporations 
headquartered in California but incorporated in another state calls 
into question the validity of the law on Commerce Clause grounds, 
which was at issue in VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen 
(VantagePoint).  In VantagePoint, the Delaware Supreme Court 
determined that the application of a California Corporate Code 
provision to a Delaware corporation violated the Commerce Clause 
of the United States Constitution reasoning that California “has no 
interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations.”69  
This same reasoning can be utilized to hold SB 826 unconstitutional. 
Since SB 826 was passed, a number of claims have been filed, but 
there has yet to be a successful challenge to the gender quota law.  In 
Meland v. Padilla, a shareholder plaintiff brought suit alleging the law 
violated the Equal Protection Clause by impairing his shareholder 
rights to vote on the board of directors.70  The Eastern District of 
California dismissed without prejudice the suit for plaintiff’s lack of 
standing to pursue the claim.71  Since SB 826 obligated the 
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corporation, rather than its shareholders, the court determined that 
the shareholder’s voting rights were in fact not impaired by the law.72  
Plaintiff has appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.73  If the 
district court’s decision remains, corporations, rather than 
shareholders, may still challenge SB 826 on other grounds;74 a 
company has yet to file such a claim and there is little guidance as to 
whether or not one will in the future. 
Even if SB 826 and SB 6037 were held to be constitutional, the 
success of gender quota laws has been questioned and debated.  
Other countries have enacted similar gender quota laws applicable to 
public corporations.  Though well-intentioned, an unanticipated 
result of such legislation was that public corporations circumvented 
the law through a change of incorporation, relocation, or dissolution; 
companies were also more likely to incorporate as private firms 
rather than public firms.75  Norway, the first to enact such a law, has 
been classified by some as a failure, as well as a cautionary tale to 
states passing similar legislation.76  There, public companies must 
comply with a quota law requiring that, at a minimum, 40% of the 
corporation’s director positions be held by women.77  When the 
Norwegian government initially enacted a quota law in 2003, it was 
applicable to a subset of companies, including those that were state-
owned or chartered as a result of special legislation.78  Norway 
anticipated broadening the scope of the law soon after it initially 
passed and began taking the necessary steps.  In 2005, a transitional 
period was provided to existing public companies in order to achieve 
the quota requirements; immediate compliance was required, 
however, for  newly incorporated public companies.79  Though 
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conformity by all applicable companies was achieved, data suggests 
companies circumvented the law through relocation, change of 
incorporation, or dissolution.80  In 2003, the number of public 
companies in Norway began to decline while the number of private 
companies increased.81  By 2009, the number of public companies, 
which were subject to the quota law, decreased by more than 70%.82  
Conversely, the number of private companies, which are not required 
to conform to the quota law, increased by 30%.83  Notably, 
employment was increasing during this period, except in 2009, 
signifying an upward economic trend.  Based on this information, 
researchers suggested that, following the announcement of the 
gender quota law, companies were more likely to incorporate as 
private firms as opposed to public firms.84  The same study also 
suggested that companies with no female directors, those most 
affected by the law, circumvented its application by a change in 
incorporation.85  These unanticipated consequences demonstrate the 
ways in which companies were able to circumvent the applicability 
of the gender quota laws and avoid penalties for failure to comply. 
Gender quota laws are often implemented as a remedy to 
increase female representation and to right the wrongs associated 
with the prior discriminatory hiring methods, but some have argued 
that while these programs are well-intentioned, they can negatively 
impact those sought to be benefited by such practices.  Data lends 
support to the assertion that preferential selection, the heightened 
weight given to “work-irrelevant” characteristics such as gender and 
race, can negatively impact a woman’s self-assessment.86  
Alternatively, those selected for a position based solely on merit did 
not experience this reduction in self-esteem.87  Based on these 
findings, SB 826 and SB 6037 may foster an environment in which 
female directors, elected after the passage of the respective state laws, 
would be devalued by colleagues and create a lack of self-esteem in 
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these women.  Similarly, one of the drawbacks associated with 
gender quota laws is the fear of instilling a “token woman” mentality, 
causing further harm and reducing the benefits to be experienced by 
a corporation for maintaining a diverse board.  Studies have 
demonstrated that our culture perceives leadership positions to be 
more masculine in character and that, as a result, the respective 
societal stereotypes of men and women influence our depiction of 
who will be most fit for such positions.  Based on these stereotypes, 
women are often thought of as maintaining “far fewer of the qualities 
that comprise effective leadership skills than do men.”88  Studies 
suggest that when gender-based preferential selection is a factor, the 
common perception is that other factors, such as competence, did not 
greatly influence the decision.89  Consequently, this may generate a 
“vicious cycle of negative self-regard for women targeted for favored 
treatment.”90  Even if a woman would have been selected for a 
position based on her skills and qualifications, this cycle may still take 
place.”91  Studies suggest that women chosen based on their gender, 
rather than merit, perceived themselves as maintaining inadequate 
basic leadership skills, and were more likely to minimize the role they 
played in successful outcomes, as they, “rated their performance 
more negatively . . . and were less eager to persist in their leadership 
roles.”92 
The significant limitations maintained by the various policy 
solutions evaluated above exemplify the need for an alternative 
approach to increase board gender diversity. 
 
V. SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION IS AN 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH THAT SHOULD BE 
UTILIZED TO ADDRESS BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY 
 
Shareholders should seek to influence management through the 
vehicles of director election and other types of shareholder 
resolutions to promote increased female representation on corporate 
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boards.  First, this section will discuss the various tools available to 
shareholders and how they should be employed.  Second, this section 
will discuss the prerequisites, and potential barriers, shareholders 
exercising this power must satisfy and ways in which these 
requirements can be overcome.  Third, this section will examine two 
prior examples of a shareholder’s use of the proxy process to include 
a shareholder director candidate on the proxy and the lessons to be 
learned from each scenario.  Fourth, this section will discuss other 
tools available to shareholders to increase female representation on 
corporate boards outside of shareholder participation in director 
elections through proxy access, including pressures from institutional 
investors and recommendations to implement other diversity 
provisions to the company’s bylaws. 
 
A. NOMINATION OF QUALIFIED FEMALE DIRECTORS BY 
SHAREHOLDERS 
 
This section argues in favor of an alternative approach, 
promoting gender diversification of corporate boards through the 
proxy process and other corporate governance tools at shareholders’ 
disposal, rather than through externally imposed requirements or 
litigation.  The proxy process enables shareholders to affect 
meaningful change to the company.  Once a corporation adopts a 
proxy access provision into its bylaws, shareholders meeting certain 
thresholds may submit director nominees to be included in the 
corporation’s proxy.  Shareholders should utilize proxy access to 
nominate director candidates to diversify boards, compel companies 
to have board members commit to more equitable gender 
representation, and submit proposals recommending the adoption 
and implementation of policies promoting gender equity.  Notably, 
these recommendations transect with current discourse regarding the 
shareholder voice in the proxy process, illustrating the importance of 
robust shareholder access to the proxy. 
 
B. PROXY ACCESS PREREQUISITES 
 
Rule 14a-8 provides public company shareholders with a 
relatively cost-efficient forum to express themselves in regard to a 
wide variety of issues of significance to shareholders, including 
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corporate governance matters.  Shareholder proposals have played 
an instrumental role in inciting change in corporations’ self-
governance mechanisms and general operations.  Proxy access, a rule 
enabling shareholders to nominate candidates on the corporation’s 
proxy, is a pivotal aspect of the shareholders’ ability to meaningfully 
exercise their voting power.  In order to gain proxy access, a provision 
must be adopted in the corporation’s bylaws granting shareholders 
proxy access. 
One way in which proxy access is obtained is via shareholder 
proposal to gain such access. “SEC Rule 14a-8 (Rule 14a-8) addresses 
when a company must include a shareholder’s proposal in its proxy 
statement and identify the proposal in its form of proxy when the 
company holds an annual or special meeting of shareholders.”93  Rule 
14a-8 requires the inclusion of shareholder proposals amending, or 
requesting an amendment to, either of the company’s governing 
documents, the Certificate of Incorporation and the bylaws, relating 
to director nomination procedures or disclosure provisions, provided 
such proposals do not otherwise conflict with SEC proxy rules or 
applicable law.94  These changes enable shareholders to submit 
proposals establishing or recommending the establishment of proxy 
access and, therefore, allow shareholders to diversify the board.95 
Previously, companies wanting to exclude shareholder proxy 
access proposals from the company proxy utilized Rule 14a-8(i)(9), 
which enables companies to exclude shareholder proposals that 
conflict with a company’s proposal.96  The SEC addressed this issue 
in the following case, clarifying the scope of Rule 14a-8(i)(9), which 
benefits shareholders. Whole Foods Market, Inc. (Whole Foods) 
sought to exclude a shareholder proposal that, if passed, would have 
allowed an individual shareholder or shareholder group holding 3% 
of Whole Foods shares for at least three years to submit up to two 
director candidates on the corporate proxy in 2014.97  Though Whole 
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Foods had not yet drafted a shareholder proxy access proposal of its 
own at the time of receipt, the company drafted such a proposal with 
more stringent standards, requiring a shareholder or shareholder 
group to maintain at least 9% of company stock for at least five years 
to be eligible to include director nominees on the company’s proxy.98  
Whole Foods claimed the shareholder proposal and the proposal 
endorsed by Whole Foods “directly conflict,” and if both were to be 
included on the proxy it “would present alternative and conflicting 
decisions for the stockholders” creating “the potential for inconsistent 
and ambiguous results.”99  The SEC issued a no-action letter stating 
they would not recommend enforcement action against Whole Foods 
for the omission of the shareholder proposal based on this reasoning 
proffered by Whole Foods.100 
The SEC later retracted the Whole Foods no-action letter and 
published a staff legal bulletin articulating a narrower interpretation 
of the exclusion’s applicability.101  A shareholder proposal would no 
longer be perceived as “directly conflicting with the management 
proposal if a reasonable shareholder, although possibly preferring 
one proposal over the other, could logically vote for both.”102  The 
staff legal bulletin then hypothecated an example similar to that of 
Whole Foods, stating that since both proposals seek to achieve “a 
similar objective, to give shareholders the ability to include their 
nominees for director alongside management’s nominees in the 
proxy statement, and the proposals do not present shareholders with 
conflicting decisions such that a reasonable shareholder could not 
logically vote in favor of both proposals,” and therefore does not fall 
within the scope of Rule 14a-8(i)(9).103 
The SEC’s retraction of the Whole Foods no-action letter and 
publication of the staff legal bulletin clarifying the scope of Rule 14a-
8(i)(9) has provided shareholders with the opportunity to ensure the 
requisite standards to be met by shareholders to submit proposals is 
not overly burdensome.  This has the effect of promoting shareholder 
proposals to gain proxy access.  Consequently, a greater number of 
shareholders, by gaining access to the proxy through such 
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shareholder proposals, will have the opportunity to submit such 
proposals to promote female director candidates for election to a 
company’s board. 
Shareholders must satisfy certain requirements in order to 
submit a proposal.  In September 2020, the SEC voted on and adopted 
amendments to modernize the shareholder proposal rule; the 
amendments eliminated the 1% threshold and amended the 
requirement with the addition of the following three thresholds: 
continuous ownership of at least $2,000 for at least 3 years, 
continuous ownership of at least $15,000 for at least 2 years, or 
continuous ownership of at least $25,000 for at least 1 year.104 
These amendments change the rule that governs the process for 
shareholder proposals to be included in a company’s proxy 
statement.105  Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 requires publicly traded 
companies under SEC regulation to include shareholder proposals in 
their proxy materials, with a few exceptions.106  A shareholder or 
shareholder group is now required to hold a minimum of $2,000 
worth of shares for at least three years.  The amendments require the 
shares to be held for at least three years in order to demonstrate long-
term investment in the company.107  The “one proposal” rule has also 
been updated to clarify that multiple proposals cannot be submitted 
by a single shareholder at the same shareholder’s meeting on behalf 
of other shareholders.108 
The SEC’s justifications for adopting these amendments were to 
ensure that shareholder proposals included in the company’s proxy, 
“and thus draw on company resources . . . to command the time and 
attention of the company and other shareholders,” consider the 
interests of all shareholders who bear the associated costs of 
“reviewing, considering, and voting on such proposals.”109  The SEC 
had determined that five individual shareholders accounted for 78% 
of all shareholder proposals and, therefore, adjustments needed to be 
 
 104. Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Amendments to Modernize Shareholder Proposal 
Rule (Nov. 5, 2019) (on file with author); Press Release SEC, SEC Adopts Amendments to 
Modernize Shareholder Proposal Rule (Sept. 23, 2020). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Amendments to Modernize Shareholder Proposal Rule 
(Sept 23, 2020). 
 
2021 HOW THE “EXCEPTION” BECOMES THE STANDARD  427 
made to address the benefits and burdens of such actions.110  It seems 
as though these amendments are meant to decrease the number of 
proposals from low-stakes shareholders looking to accomplish their 
niche agendas, while preserving “the ability of small, medium- and 
long-term shareholders to continue to enter and engage in the 
shareholder process,” so long as such claims were aimed at creating 
long-term value.111  As demonstrated by the previously discussed 
findings, increased female representation on corporate boards is 
correlated to a number of outcomes that results in better firm 
performance, and arguably long-term value.  Finally, the SEC Chair 
articulated that the amendments would foster proponent-issuer 
engagement sooner,112 which may also result in fruitful conversations 
relating to increased female representation on corporate boards and 
achieving gender parity.  While these recently adopted amendments 
did heighten the standards shareholders must satisfy in order to 
submit a proposal, they do not appear to substantially thwart a 
shareholder or shareholder group’s objective in proxy access and 
director nominations. 
 
C. PRIOR CASES OF SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN THE 
DIRECTOR NOMINATION PROCESS 
 
The adoption of proxy access bylaws has skyrocketed in recent 
years.  At the end of 2019, 76% of S&P 500 companies’ bylaws 
included a proxy access provision, compared to less than 1% in 
2014.113  Companies generally limit a shareholder’s ability to utilize 
proxy access to nominate the candidates through the bylaws.  The 
most common terms are known as the “3/3/20/20 provision.”114  The 
provision permits a shareholder owning, at a minimum, 3% of shares 
of the company for three years to put forward nominees equating up 
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to 20% of the number of seats on the board, or at least two directors.115  
In the case of shareholder groups, the maximum number of 
shareholders able to aggregate their holdings to satisfy the requisite 
threshold is twenty.116  While shareholder access to the proxy has 
drastically increased, shareholders have made little use of these 
provisions.  With only two cases exemplifying the use of proxy access 
to nominate directors, there is little guidance on what tactics work 
effectively to ensure a shareholder-nominated candidate will meet 
the requirements set in the bylaws of a company.  In the first instance, 
an institutional investor’s proposal was not in compliance with the 
company’s bylaws and, as a result, was not included in the 
company’s proxy materials.117  In the second instance, the shareholder 
proposal was included in the proxy materials and resulted in the 
election of the shareholder nominee.118 
The first attempt to utilize the proxy access process was made by 
GAMCO Asset Management Inc. and Gabelli Funds, LLC 
(collectively, GAMCO) to nominate a director candidate to the 
National Fuel Gas Company (National Fuel) board of directors in 
2017.119  GAMCO is made up of entities affiliated with activist 
investor Mario Gabelli.120  The National Fuel board of directors 
reviewed the letters submitted by GAMCO to determine whether the 
nomination was in compliance with the company’s bylaws relating to 
shareholder nominations of director candidates.121 
The board found that GAMCO had not complied, and would not 
be able to comply, with the terms set forth in the bylaws.122  The key 
parameters of National Fuel’s proxy access provision mirrored the 
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“3/3/20/20 provision.”123  Satisfaction of the “3/3/20/20 provision” 
is not determinative in each case; here, GAMCO had owned greater 
than 3% of National Fuel’s shares for more than three years, yet still 
was unable to meet the requirements set forth in the proxy access 
provision. 
Other requirements may be articulated in a company’s 
governing documents, further limiting a shareholder or shareholder 
group’s ability to include a director candidate in the proxy materials.  
One of the representations to be made by a National Fuel shareholder 
seeking to use the proxy access provision is that the shareholder did 
not obtain the requisite number of shares with the “intent to change 
or influence the company,” but “in the ordinary course of 
business.”124  The board denied GAMCO’s nomination because they 
had failed on two counts.125  First, after review of GAMCO’s filings 
under Section 13(d), the board opined that GAMCO’s previous and 
current conduct demonstrated an intent to “change or influence the 
company” in acquiring the requisite number of shares, and therefore 
was not able to utilize the proxy access provision to nominate a 
director candidate.126 
Second, GAMCO, through the use of a shareholder proposal, 
requested National Fuel to consider spinning-off a segment of its 
operations into a stand-alone entity.127  While this proposal received 
17.8% support, National Fuel did not pursue this recommendation.128  
Consequently, GAMCO repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with 
National Fuel’s decision and articulated its own desire to “split up 
the company,” resulting in the board’s determination that GAMCO 
maintained “a current intent to change or influence control of the 
Corporation.”129 
GAMCO’s attempted use of shareholder proxy access to 
nominate a director candidate demonstrates one of the ways in which 
a company may deny a proposal based on the issuer’s governing 
documents, such as the certificate of incorporation or bylaws.  While 
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GAMCO’s proposal was unsuccessful, National Fuel’s letter to 
GAMCO, as an institutional investor, demonstrated a commitment to 
maintaining shareholder proxy access and the board’s belief that 
shareholder(s) should have access to the proxy in this way if in 
compliance with the bylaws.130  The letter further stated the adoption 
of proxy access was motivated in part by the significance the board 
and company as a whole place on their relationships with 
shareholders.131  Novel approaches to resolve an issue are not 
successful from the get-go; it is a process of trial and error.  Those 
wanting to put forth a director candidate must utilize the knowledge 
gained from prior successes, as well as the failures, in order to make 
progress.  The lesson, and cautionary tale, established in GAMCO is 
that it is vital to ensure the shareholder putting forth a director 
candidate to include on the proxy is able to meet the requirements set 
forth in the company’s governing documents, or else such submission 
will likely be excluded from the proxy for the shareholder(s) failure 
to comply.  GAMCO’s attempt is instructive and a useful source of 
information for future shareholders wishing to participate in the 
director nomination process and highlights the importance of 
understanding the threshold requirements that must be met by 
shareholders. 
In contrast, the second use of proxy access resulted in a 
successful outcome. On December 27, 2018, the Austin Trust, in 
compliance with the proxy access bylaws of The Joint Corporation 
(The Joint Corp.), nominated Glenn Krevlin for election to the board 
of directors of the company.132  Similar to National Fuel’s proxy access 
bylaw, a portion of The Joint Corp.’s proxy access requirements 
resembled a “3/3/20/20 provision.”133  According to the Form 8-K 
submitted by The Joint Corp., Krevlin was one of seven members 
elected to the board of directors, receiving over 99% of votes cast in 
favor of election.134  Krevlin received 7,373,369 votes in favor of 
election with only 950 votes against, receiving more “yes votes” than 
two of the other elected directors.135  Krevlin received 630,276 more 
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votes than James Amos Jr. and 1,542,044 more votes than Ronald 
DaVella.136  The director who received the most yes votes beat Krevlin 
by only 37,854 votes.137 
The Austin Trust success gives shareholders hope that a 
shareholder’s use of proxy access can impact real change at the board 
level, but some relevant facts may have contributed to its success.  
Steven Colmar, trustee of The Austin Trust, had significant ties to The 
Joint Corp. Notably, Colmar co-founded The Joint Corp. and served 
on the company’s board of directors with his brother, Craig, until his 
resignation in 2017.138  Craig Colmar also is the Secretary of the 
company.139  These connections may have impacted the willingness 
of the issuer to be amenable to The Austin Trust’s nomination and are 
therefore relevant here. Regardless of the familial relationship, The 
Austin Trust’s successful proposal is instructive, exemplifying 
shareholder compliance with a company’s bylaws and resulting in 
the inclusion of such proposal in the company’s proxy materials. 
These two cases provide instructive guidance as to how eligible 
shareholders may wish to formulate proposals and take advantage of 
the opportunity to proactively increase gender-diversity of corporate 
boards.  The nomination of directors by shareholders through proxy 
access is an economical method for eligible shareholders to nominate 
candidates to boards, creating a credible threat to current board 
members that may incentivize increased communications with their 
shareholders.140  With the use of proxy access, a shareholder or 
shareholder group may nominate a qualified female candidate to the 
board, increasing board diversity.  Submitting such proposals, 
regardless of if they come to a vote, will communicate to the board 
that gender parity is a key issue to the company’s stakeholders. 
 
D. EVEN WITHOUT THE USE OF SHAREHOLDER-NOMINATED 
DIRECTORS, SHAREHOLDERS SHOULD UTILIZE OTHER FORUMS 
TO INCREASE FEMALE REPRESENTATION ON CORPORATE 
BOARDS. 
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While the adoption of proxy access provisions has steadily 
increased, there are a number of companies in which shareholders are 
unable to submit director nominations due to lack of access to the 
proxy.  Shareholders, including institutional investors, may compel 
companies to commit to more equitable gender representation and 
submit proposals recommending the adoption and implementation 
of provisions that support increased female representation on 
corporate boards, without putting forward a specific candidate. 
Institutional investors, such as Blackrock, hold sway with 
corporations and may set expectations and guidelines for companies 
they have invested in.141  In regard to board composition, Blackrock 
emphasizes the importance of board diversity, articulating that if the 
firm believes an issuer has not sufficiently increased board diversity, 
it may result in the firm voting “against the nominating/governance 
committee for an apparent lack of commitment to board 
effectiveness.”142  This forum enables shareholders to express their 
dissatisfaction with the nominating and governance committees’ 
members and further pressures these directors to consider increasing 
gender diversity. 
State Street Global Advisors (SSGA) has also provided guidance 
for boards to encourage the facilitation and maintenance of greater 
female representation in their companies and organizations.143  SSGA 
first addresses current practices and biases thwarting the increase of 
female representation on corporate boards, citing issues such as 
requiring director nominees to have CEO experience and the 
overwhelming reliance on existing networks for director nominees.144  
SSGA highlights six steps directors should follow to promote gender 
diversity of corporate boards.145  Boards of directors are encouraged 
to: (1) evaluate the company’s current status in regard to gender 
diversity on both the board and management levels, (2) set goals to 
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heighten female representation at these senior levels, (3) identify 
directors and members of senior management to actively promote 
and support these goals, (4) acknowledge the biases associated with 
the director nomination process and work to prevent such biases 
from interfering, (5) nominate and consider women for board and 
senior management positions, and (6) communicate transparently 
with shareholders and describe the steps taken by the board to 
address the issue of gender diversity.146 
Institutional investors have also submitted shareholder 
proposals urging companies to implement a Rooney Rule, a provision 
that was first implemented by the National Football League; this 
provision requires teams to interview “at least one minority 
candidate for any open head coaching or general manager 
position.”147 
CtW Investment Group submitted a shareholder proposal 
recommending the adoption of a Rooney Rule at Amazon, which if 
implemented, would require the “initial list of candidates from which 
new management-supported director nominees are chosen should 
include (but need not be limited to) qualified women and minority 
candidates.”148  Initially, the shareholder proposal was not supported 
by Amazon’s board of directors,  emphasizing that Amazon’s current 
methods for the recruitment and evaluation of board candidates 
reflected the company’s commitment to diversity.149  After the release 
of the proxy statements expressing Amazon’s opposition to the 
shareholder proposal, the company experienced significant backlash, 
with employees and other stakeholders questioning Amazon’s 
commitment.150  At the time the proposal was submitted, the 
corporate governance guidelines stated “‘the Nominating and 
Corporate Governance Committee . . . seeks out candidates with a 
diversity of experience and perspectives,’”151 yet the two most recent 
additions to the board are white men who were recommended by 
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current members of the board.152  Amazon’s adoption of the Rooney 
Rule provision can be utilized as an example to shareholders, 
demonstrating the effective use of a shareholder proposal to direct 
the board members’ attention to a key-issue important not only to 
shareholders, but other stakeholders as well. The examples above 
demonstrate the sway institutional investors hold with companies 
who tend to be more receptive to the investors’ proposals and 
recommendations.  Since institutional investors may be better 
situated to make such recommendations and hold greater influence 
over corporations, these alternative solutions are more efficient and 
effective mediums that can affect real change and increase female 




Gender diversity of corporate boards has developed into a 
sizeable concern for corporate boards, with various stakeholders 
expressing a keen interest in increasing female representation.  While 
a number of policy solutions have been suggested and utilized to 
advance this cause, such as the use of SEC disclosure requirements, 
shareholder derivative suits, and the passage of state legislation, they 
are accompanied by significant limitations, calling into question the 
effectiveness of such approaches.  Shareholders have the unique 
opportunity to actively promote gender diversity and increase female 
representation on corporate boards through a number of forums, 
including the nomination of director candidates to be included on the 
company’s proxy, institutional investors placing pressures on 
companies to diversify, and recommending the adoption of 
provisions such as the Rooney Rule.  Shareholder participation in the 
director nomination process is a better and more effective strategy to 
accomplish the goal of increased female representation on corporate 
boards and should be utilized to a greater extent by shareholders 
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